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A DISCURSIVE APPROACH TO PSYCHOLOGICAL MATTERS
One of the features of various academic responses to discursive psychological research has been a mistaken representation of the status of the 'psychological'.
Sometimes the assumption is made that it involves the attempt to make a psychology-based intervention in social science debates. The recent HF paper to which we are responding provides another example of this confusion. In this paper we take the opportunity to tackle some of these confusions head-on, beginning with a consideration of some of discursive psychology's (hereafter DP) antecedents.
In the early 1960s, when Sacks was starting to develop the ideas that were later to become foundational for conversational analysis, psychology did not figure highly in his interests (Sacks, 1992) . His theoretical and analytic foils tended to be Parsonian sociology or Chicago school ethnography, and his critique of both was built up through the course of the lectures. Despite his lack of specific focus on psychology, Sacks' work can now be understood to provide a radical alternative to traditional cognitivist approaches to psychology (Edwards, 1995) . Most fundamentally, he rejected the prevailing John Locke style picture of language as a set of signs for transporting thoughts from one mind to another, in favour of considering talk as a medium for action. His focus was on the basic issue of how language can work as something that can be both learnable and understandable. Very early on (in the Spring of 1964) this led to his often quoted caution about researchers using cognitive intuitions:
When people start to analyze social phenomena, if it looks like things occur with the sort of immediacy we find in some of these exchanges, then, if you have to make an elaborate analysis of it -that is to say, show that they did something as involved as some of the things I have proposed -then you figure that they couldn't have thought that fast. I want to suggest that you have to forget that completely. Don't worry about how fast they're thinking. First of all, don't worry about whether they're 'thinking.' Just try to come to terms with how it is that the thing comes off. Because you'll find that they can do these things (Sacks, 1992, vol. I: 11) .
On the whole, conversation analysis has followed this injunction, which has appropriately disengaged it from cognitivist thinking. Instead the focus has been very much on what is seeable or hearable in interaction. Sacks started with the issue of how conversation makes sense (in all its rich detail of intonation, stress, timing and so on) and how issues such as understanding, knowledge, and evaluation are delivered conversationally. From this point of view cognition -mind, thoughts, intentions and so onare relevant to, and involved in, interaction in terms of their current hearability in the interaction itself. This is quite distinct from the classic psychological project of discovering the nature of peoples' mental furniture, and also different from the critical social psychological project of exploring peoples' ideologically built interiority. Sacks quoted approvingly Freud's observation that 'the problem is not how is it that people come to think that others know their thoughts, but how is it that people come to think so deeply that others don't know their thoughts?' (Sacks, 1992, vol. I: 114) .
One way of understanding the intellectual place of discursive psychology (henceforth DP) is of taking the kinds of fragmentary focus on psychological matters we see in Sacks' work and developing their implications more systematically. This has involved considering psychological concerns as features of situated practices; and that, in turn, is part of a radical and wholesale respecification of the project of psychology. Part of the development of DP has involved a now longstanding dialogue with cognitivist and social cognitivist psychology (e.g. Edwards & Potter, 1992) . Typically this has involved an exploration of the implications that understanding peoples' talk as dialogically, sequentially and practically organized has for the empirical basis of cognitive research studies. One of the features that distinguished most DP from even closely related traditions of discourse analysis was its use of records of natural interaction. This meant that DP worked with psychology situated in specific everyday or institutional settings -police interrogations, psychiatric assessments, and family mealtimes. This is in sharp contrast with mainstream social cognitive tradition in psychology, which overwhelmingly models action ('behaviour') experimentally with the aim of adducing general, trans-situation, trans-historical processes.
Another part of this development has involved a more systematic and cumulative set of studies of the way psychological matters such as intention, assessment, upset, understanding become live as participants' concerns (see examples in Potter, 2007) 'accounts' and invocations of 'inner' states must be understood in terms of the practical accomplishment of social organization. HF offers some critical observations about a paper by Edwards (2006) that are taken to show a relatively covert 'importing a psychological intention' and is taken to reveal contradictions between theory and analytic practice and it goes on to offer some indicative analyses of its own working with different kinds of material.
There are many things of value in HF. However, we are doubtful of its approach to disciplines and the importance of 'canon'; we find a range of confusions and problems in its representation of DP; and we find important limitations in the offered analytic alternatives.
We will take these areas in turn.
Disciplines and the canon
There are many ways of constructing the history of Sociology as a discipline and judging the crucial 'canon' of interactional work. Although the Catholic Church has the Pope to pronounce which books should be sacred (OED's core meaning of 'canon'), things are more open in the social sciences. We are less concerned about Sociology (or Psychology, or Linguistics, even) as disciplines than with generating progressive theorizing and developing powerful analytic work. HF's promotion of a canon seems to us to be a conservative move.
Moreover, HF's claim about amnesia is simply erroneous and their specific identification of the canon at the very least problematic. One of the problems with HF is that it is organized around disciplinary allegiance and sacred texts rather than around the specific arguments and analytic developments. (Garfinkel, 1967; 2002) . Likewise there are different emerging foci in conversation analysis, partly in consideration to how foundational sequential analysis will be and how far turn design can be analysed in an autonomous manner, and partly in consideration of how far conversation analysis can be merged with work that uses standard sociological variables. Blurring over these important differences in pursuit of a canon is a recipe for confusion rather than constructive theory development. helpful glosses (with which we have no problems at all) when informing us, contextually to a data extract, that the 'Phillips report had suggested that individual blame was not appropriate in the case of the BSE crisis; whilst a culture of secrecy had provided a source of problems in dealing with the crisis at an organisational level' (HF, ms. 22).
Housley and Fitzgerald's analytic examples
We have no particular interest in attacking HF's analytic examples. They are, after all, all interesting and worthy of systematic study. We feel obliged to make some observations, however, as they are offered as improvements on what currently exist in DP.
HF analyse the following example from a radio phone in: HF's point is, no doubt, that 'think' can be analysed in a way that does not treat it as a mental object. As researchers not afflicted by sociological amnesia, we are familiar with similar analyses from ethnomethodologists (cf. Coulter, 1979) and have developed analyses of 'think' in practice which are non-cognitivist (Edwards & Potter, 2005; Potter, 2007;  more??* merit -however, insofar as they are offered as illustrating a more coherent approach to 'psychological matters' we think they are seriously mistaken.
Let us restrict ourselves to a few more comments about HF's second extract and its analysis. As part of developing their criticisms H&F note the importance of sequence organisation, repair and preference organisation for their own understanding of accounts (HF, ms. 11). It is therefore odd that none of these analytic resources appear in this paper.
For example, extract 2 contains a number of self-and other-initiated repairs, the latter in particular being crucial in unpacking the activities performed by the interviewer's questions.
They focus in particular on the following fragment from extract 2, in which the caller offers a description of uniformed prison officers:
Rather than glossing the interviewer's turn ('left wing element') on 13 as an other-initiated repair providing a candidate understanding of, and so displaying some trouble with, the prior turn, H&F opt for simply noting that 'a clarification is sought' (HF, ms. 21) and that this action invokes 'a possible category disjuncture between a social category and the opinions and motives predicated to that category' (HF, ms. 21). They note that in doing this the Moreover, H&F's whole argument here is designed to show that 'opinions' are best analysed in terms of how they are displayed interactionally, but this is a foundational discursive psychological point (Potter, 1998) , which has been made more explicitly and clearly in a number of publications (Puchta and Potter etc) so it's not clear who the target of H&F's argument ought to be.
The oppositional sense of line 13 in extract 2 is also displayed by its contrastive stress, and yet this is not noted by H&F, who elsewhere in their critique of Edwards (2006) make much of the importance of having a detailed transcript for warranting analytic claims made (HF, ms. 17). It is therefore disappointing that their transcripts are missing a number of key features -the timing of pauses and gaps, key points of emphasis, delivery and pitch change, and closing and continuing intonation, all of which are crucial for understanding the actions and projects underway (we requested access to soundfiles but they were unavailable). Line 13 is one of the few times that the reader is given any sense of how the turn was delivered, and there remains uncertainty as to whether this represents emphasis (in line with Jeffersonian CA conventions; Jefferson, 2004) or a pitch change (suggested by their own index).
We could go on, but we hope that we have made the point sufficiently. Discursive psychology is neither cognitivist nor anti-sociological. It certainly raises questions with HF's illustrious canon, but is happy to do so. It continues to be defined by systematic and careful studies which consider psychological matters in terms of their place in situated practices. It continues to develop through close engagement with conversation analysis and new empirical materials.
